EVENT STUDIES IN
SECTION 10(B) CLASS ACTIONS
Samuel R. Henninger*
If you are interested in billions of dollars in lost money,1 a
conspiracy to mislead the public,2 and Dick Cheney,3 then this topic is for
you. In Part I, I discuss section 10(b) class actions. In Part II, I discuss
the Halliburton litigation. In Part III, I discuss event studies.
I.

SECTION 10(B) CLASS ACTIONS

On June 6, 1934, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 into law.4 This law established the
Securities and Exchange Commission.5 Congress decided to regulate
“transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities
exchanges and over-the-counter markets [because they] are effected with
a national public interest.”6 To serve that purpose, it enacted section
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Fourth Consolidated Amended Complaint for Violation of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 at 4, Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No.
3:02-CV-1152-M (N.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2006) [hereinafter Fourth Amended Complaint]
(subsequent history omitted).
1

Id. at 2–3 (“This action arises out of a scheme to manipulate and falsify Halliburton’s
98-01 financial results and statements, including a series of false and misleading
statements that misrepresented the condition and success of Halliburton’s business,
including its construction operations, the benefits of its acquisition of Dresser, its
exposure to asbestos liabilities, Halliburton’s financial condition and results of operations
and its future business and financial prospects.”).
2

Id. at 2 (“[The individual defendants in the Halliburton litigation] operated under the
leadership of Richard Cheney, who became CEO/Chairman of Halliburton in 8/95 and
served as its CEO/Chairman until 7/00, when he left to run for Vice President – hailed
on his departure as a successful corporate executive who had turned Halliburton around,
reorganized its construction businesses, made a very successful acquisition, [and] led
Halliburton to record profitability and positioned Halliburton to continue to achieve
growing profits going forward.”).
3

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012)).
4

5

15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2012).

6

15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012).
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10(b).7 This section prohibits the use of “any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe.”8
In 1942, to exercise its power under section 10(b), the Securities
and Exchange Commission adopted rule 10b-5.9 This rule makes the
following activity illegal:
[A]ny person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.10
A private plaintiff may bring a damages action under this statute
and rule.11 A securities fraud class action is an example of a damages
action that a private plaintiff may bring under this statute and rule.12
II.

HALLIBURTON LITIGATION

In 2002, the Erica P. John Fund and other plaintiffs filed a
securities fraud class action against Halliburton.13 The plaintiffs purchased
common stock of Halliburton between June 3, 1999, and December 7,
2001.14 They claimed that they suffered significant damages because of
7

§ 10(b), 48 Stat. at 891.

8

Id.

Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws:
The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 977 (1994).
9

10

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018).

11

See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005).

12

Id. at 339, 341.

Ryan Holeywell, High Court Ruling Pleases Halliburton, HOUS. CHRON. (June 23, 2014),
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/article/High-court-ruling-pleasesHalliburton-5574124.php.
13

14

Fourth Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 2.
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“defendants’ scheme to defraud and the resulting artificial inflation in
Halliburton’s stock price due to defendants’ financial falsifications and
other misleading statements.”15 During the class period, Halliburton’s
stock dropped from a high of $56 per share to $10 per share.16 Plaintiffs
alleged that the stock price fell because “defendants’ prior manipulations,
misrepresentations and other fraudulent conduct were revealed.”17 The
lawsuit was originally filed in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, and it reached the United States Supreme
Court twice.18
The Supreme Court decided Halliburton I on June 6, 2011.19 Chief
Justice John Roberts wrote the unanimous opinion.20 At the district court
level, the lead plaintiff, Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (EPJ Fund), defeated
Halliburton’s motion to dismiss.21 Next, the district court found that the
EPJ Fund’s proposed class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 met
the requirement in section (a) but failed to meet the requirement in section
(b)(3).22 To certify the EPJ Fund’s proposed class, the district court held
that it needed to see evidence of “‘loss causation with respect to any’ of
its claims.”23
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed.24 It held that the district court properly refused to grant class
15

Id. at 3.

16

Id. at 4.

17

Id. at 3–4.

Nate Raymond, Halliburton Shareholder Class Action to Settle for $100 Million, REUTERS
(Dec. 23, 2016, 6:48 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-halliburton-lawsuitidUSKBN14C2BD.
18

19

Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 563 U.S. 804 (2011).

20

Id. at 806.

21

Id. at 807–08.

22

Id. at 808.

Id. “The elements of a private securities fraud claim based on violations of § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 are: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2)
scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase
or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic
loss; and (6) loss causation.” Id. at 809–10 (internal quotations omitted) (citations
omitted).
23

24

Id. at 809.
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certification because the EPJ Fund failed to prove “that the corrected
truth of the former falsehoods actually caused the stock price to fall and
resulted in the losses.”25 And to “resolve a conflict among the Circuits as
to whether securities fraud plaintiffs must prove loss causation in order to
obtain class certification,” the Supreme Court granted the EPJ Fund’s
appeal from the Fifth Circuit.26
The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit “erred by requiring
EPJ Fund to show loss causation as a condition of obtaining class
certification.”27 First, the issue addressed by the Supreme Court was
whether the EPJ Fund met the requirements for class certification under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b): “that the questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”28 In a
securities fraud action, a case such as this one, “[w]hether common
questions of law or fact predominate . . . often turns on the element of
reliance.”29
Second, the Supreme Court previously entitled plaintiffs in
securities fraud actions to a rebuttable presumption that the element of
reliance is met because of the “fraud-on-the-market” theory.30 To get this
rebuttable presumption, however, the EPJ Fund needed to prove the
following: “that the alleged misrepresentations were publicly known (else
how would the market take them into account?), that the stock traded in
an efficient market, and that the relevant transaction took place ‘between
the time the misrepresentations were made and the time the truth was
revealed.’”31 The next part is where the Supreme Court found an error in
the Fifth Circuit’s logic.32
The Fifth Circuit added an element that the EPJ Fund needed to
prove at the certification stage: loss causation.33 The Supreme Court
25

Id.

26

Id.

27

Id. at 813.

28

Id. at 809 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)).

29

Id. at 810.

30

Id. at 811 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988)).

31

Id. (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 n.27).

32

Id.

33

Id.
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found that that additional requirement was “not justified by Basic or its
logic.”34 First, the Supreme Court never required a plaintiff to prove loss
causation to invoke the rebuttable presumption under Basic.35 Indeed, loss
causation is never mentioned in the Basic opinion.36 Second, loss causation
is simply different than reliance—leading to the conclusion that proving
loss causation could not help to prove reliance.37 “The fact that a
subsequent loss may have been caused by factors other than the revelation
of a misrepresentation has nothing to do with whether an investor relied
on the misrepresentation in the first place, either directly or presumptively
through the fraud-on-the-market theory.”38 In sum, the Supreme Court
vacated the judgment of the Fifth Circuit after concluding that it erred by
placing the burden of proving loss causation on the EPJ Fund at the
certification state.39
The Supreme Court decided Halliburton II on June 23, 2014.40
Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the majority opinion.41 After losing at
the Supreme Court in Halliburton I on the issue of loss causation,
Halliburton argued on remand that it had rebutted the EPJ Fund’s reliance
presumption “because the evidence it had earlier introduced to disprove
loss causation also showed that none of its alleged misrepresentations had
actually affected its stock price.”42 But this time, the district court held in
favor of the EPJ Fund and certified its proposed class under Rule
23(b)(3).43 In turn, the Fifth Circuit affirmed.44 And the Supreme Court
granted Halliburton’s appeal from the Fifth Circuit.45

34

Id. at 812.

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id. at 813.

38

Id.

39

Id. at 815.

40

Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).

41

Id. at 2404–05.

42

Id. at 2406.

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Id. at 2407.
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This time, the Supreme Court decided two issues: (1) whether the
“presumption of reliance for securities fraud claims that [it] adopted in
Basic” should be overruled and (2) “whether securities fraud defendants
may attempt to rebut the Basic presumption at the class certification stage
with evidence of a lack of price impact.”46 First, the Supreme Court
refused to overturn the reliance presumption under Basic because
Halliburton failed to demonstrate a “special justification” for doing so.47
Halliburton’s argument that “the Basic presumption contravenes
congressional intent and has been undermined by subsequent
developments in economic theory” failed to convince the Supreme Court
to overturn the case.48
Second, the Supreme Court considered whether “defendants
should at least be allowed to defeat the presumption at the class
certification stage through evidence that the misrepresentation did not in
fact affect the stock price.”49 Halliburton sought to present the evidence
not only at the merits stage but also at the class certification stage.50 And
the Supreme Court ruled in Halliburton’s favor on this issue: “defendants
must be afforded an opportunity before class certification to defeat the
presumption through evidence that an alleged misrepresentation did not
actually affect the market price of the stock.”51 One way to do so was
described by the Supreme Court.52 Defendants may present “event
studies—regression analyses that seek to show that the market price of
the defendant’s stock tends to respond to pertinent publicly reported
events.”53

46

Id.

47

Id. (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000)).

48

Id. at 2408.

49

Id. at 2414.

50

Id.

Id. at 2417. The parties ultimately “reached a $100 million settlement to resolve [the]
long-running securities fraud class action lawsuit against the oilfield services provider that
twice reached the U.S. Supreme Court.” Raymond, supra note 18. “Halliburton said the
company itself would pay $54 million of the $100 million settlement, while its insurer
would fund the rest.” Id.
51

52

Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2415.

Id. To measure the effect of events on stock prices, “[f]inancial economists use event
studies.” Jill E. Fisch, Jonah B. Gelbach & Jonathan Klick, The Logic and Limits of Event
Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 96 TEX. L. REV. 553, 555 (2018) (“The core contribution
of the event study is its ability to differentiate between price fluctuations that reflect the
range of typical variation for a security and a highly unusual price impact that often may
53
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EVENT STUDIES

A few months after the Supreme Court decided Halliburton II,
Halliburton filed its event study at the district court level.54 The report
was prepared by Lucy P. Allen, “a Senior Vice President of NERA
Economic Consulting (“NERA”) and member of NERA’s Securities and
Finance Practice.”55 She had “an A.B. from Stanford University, an M.B.A.
with a concentration in Finance and Accounting from Yale University, and
M.A. and M. Phil. degrees in Economics, also from Yale University.”56
Before joining NERA, she served on the Council of Economic Advisers
for both President George H.W. Bush and President Bill Clinton.57 At
NERA, she served as a consultant and expert witness on issues of
securities and financial economics.58 At the time of the report, her hourly
rate at NERA was $725 per hour.59
Not including exhibits and appendices, the report was 130 pages
long.60 In sum, Allen’s report found “no price impact from any of the
[EPJ Fund’s] alleged misrepresentations.”61 The report divided these
alleged misrepresentations into three categories: (1) “[c]ost savings from
Halliburton’s merger with Dresser Industries,” (2) “[a]ccounting for
unapproved claims on fixed-price construction contracts,” and (3)
“[r]eporting of asbestos liability arising out of Halliburton’s exposure to
asbestos claims.”62 To explain why the alleged misrepresentations had no
impact on price, she used detailed graphs, tables, and timelines.63
reasonably be inferred from a highly unusual price movement that occurs immediately
after an event and has no other potential causes.”).
Export Report of Lucy P. Allen, Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v.
Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-CV-1152-M (N.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2014) [hereinafter Event
Study] (subsequent history omitted).
54

55

Id. at 7.

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id. at 8.

60

Id. at 136.

61

Id. at 8.

62

Id. at 9–10.

63

E.g., id. at 11, 25, 29, 50, 84, 111, 116, 125.
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First, the EPJ Fund alleged that Halliburton “falsely stated that
cost savings from the merger [with Dresser Industries] were expected to
be approximately $500 million.”64 Later, as the EPJ Fund alleged, “the
truth about the cost savings from the merger was revealed to the market
over a series of partial corrective disclosures, causing the stock to
decline.”65 None of these partial corrective disclosures, however, revealed
“new information regarding the cost savings from the merger.”66 In sum,
“there was no statistically significant price reaction after any of the alleged
misrepresentations.”67
Second, the EPJ Fund alleged that Halliburton used “unapproved
claims for cost overruns on fixed-price construction contracts to increase
revenues and inflate the value of its stock.”68 Later, as the EPJ Fund
alleged, “the truth behind [Halliburton’s] accounting for unapproved
claims was revealed to the market in a series of alleged corrective
disclosures, causing the stock price to decline.”69 All of these alleged
corrective disclosures, however, “were not, in fact, corrective of any
alleged misrepresentation regarding accounting for unapproved claims.”70
In sum, “there was no statistically significant price reaction after any of
these alleged misrepresentations (before and after adjusting for multiple
comparisons).”71
Third, the EPJ Fund “allege[d] 25 dates on which Halliburton
allegedly misrepresented its reported asbestos liability.”72 Later, as the EPJ
64

Id. at 24.

65

Id.

Id. at 27. These were the six alleged corrective disclosures: (1) “Halliburton announced
sale of Dresser joint ventures and lower-than-expected 3Q99 earnings”; (2) “Merrill
Lynch and Brown Brothers Harriman reduced their earnings per share estimates”; (3)
Halliburton announced it planned to restructure its [Engineering & Construction (E&C)]
segment by combining its E&C businesses into one entity”; (4) Halliburton announced a
general negative near-term outlook, E&C restructuring, and a total $120 million after-tax
charge related to the E&C restructuring and project losses”; (5) “Alleged continuation of
12/21/00 alleged corrective disclosure”; and (6) “Halliburton announced a $193 million
pre-tax charge related to the E&C restructuring and project losses.” Id.
66

67

Id. at 25.

68

Id. at 52.

69

Id.

Id. at 55. These six alleged corrective disclosures were the same alleged corrective
disclosures as those in the first category of alleged misrepresentations. Id. at 27, 54–55.
70

71

Id. at 53.

72

Id. at 70.

2019]

EVENT STUDIES IN SECTION 10(B) CLASS ACTIONS

795

Fund alleged, Halliburton made “seven partial corrective disclosures . . .
regarding asbestos liability.”73 Finally, however, “after making the
appropriate adjustment for multiple comparisons, there was no statistically
significant price reaction after any of the alleged misrepresentations.”74
To draw these conclusions, the report “used a statistical analysis
called a regression.”75 Sir Francis Galton, half-cousin of Charles Darwin,
coined the term “regression” in 1886.76
Galton discovered that the average heights of fathers and sons are
linked by a regression equation. He also uncovered an interesting
implication of this particular regression model . . . parents who are taller
than average will have children who are not quite as tall, while parents who
are shorter than average will have children who are a bit taller. . . .
. . . Today, we call this property “regression to the mean.”
Regression to the mean is not a causal relationship. Rather,
it’s a statistical property of correlated pairs of variables like
the heights of fathers and sons. Although fathers’ and
sons’ heights are never exactly the same, their frequency
distributions are essentially unchanging. This distributional
stability generates the Galton regression.77
Regression is a tool that “can have much of the causality-revealing
power of a real experiment.”78 But presenting a statistical regression

Id. at 71. These were the seven alleged corrective disclosures: (1) “Halliburton disclosed
that Harbison Walker had asked for financial and asbestos claims management
assistance”; (2) “Halliburton’s 2Q01 10-Q states that its reported net liability for known
open asbestos claims is $124 million”; (3) “Halliburton announced $21.3 million
Mississippi verdict”; (4) “Alleged continuation of 10/30/01 alleged corrective
disclosure”; (5) “Halliburton announced Texas judgments”; (6) “Alleged continuation of
12/4/01 alleged corrective disclosure”; and (7) “Halliburton announced $30 million
Maryland verdict.” Id. at 71–72.
73

74

Id. at 73.

75

Id. at 19.

JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MASTERING ’METRICS: THE PATH
FROM CAUSE TO EFFECT 79 (2015). See generally Francis Galton, Regression Towards
Mediocrity in Hereditary Stature, 15 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. GR. BRIT. & IR. 246 (1886).
76

77

ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra note 76, at 80.

78

Id. at 47.
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analysis in an event study is not without its problems.79 In brief, reasonable
people may disagree about the ability of an event study to prove the
absence of price impact from alleged misrepresentations.
So should a defendant be allowed to use an event study at the class
certification stage to show that an alleged misrepresentation failed to
affect the market price of the stock? The Supreme Court said yes,80 and it
made the right decision. The United States of America was founded with
a goal of establishing equality.81 To help ensure equality, the Supreme
Court made the right decision. If plaintiffs are entitled to a presumption
in class action litigation, defendants ought to be afforded the opportunity
to rebut that presumption with direct price impact evidence.

See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Future of Price Distortion in Federal Securities Fraud Litigation, 10
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 96 (2015) (“The standard event study used in
securities litigation only shows the absence of a statistically significant price impact, not the
absence of price impact. The difference is critical.”); Michael J. Kaufman & John M.
Wunderlich, Regressing: The Troubling Dispositive Role of Event Studies in Securities Fraud
Litigation, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 183, 188 (2009) (“[R]equiring an event study at the
initial stages of the plaintiffs’ case takes fact questions regarding materiality, reliance,
causation and damages from the province of the jury in contravention of the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial. Additionally, it imposes an unjustifiable barrier to
meritorious claims inconsistent with the language of the securities laws. Moreover, any
requirement that an expert be called to present a statistical regression analysis to establish
materiality, reliance, loss causation, and damages is inconsistent with the policies
underlying the federal securities laws.” (footnotes omitted)).
79

80

Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417 (2014).

See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, at 173 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey &
James McClellan eds., 2001) (“There are strong minds in every walk of life, that will rise
superior to the disadvantages of situation, and will command the tribute due to their
merit, not only from the classes to which they particularly belong, but from the society
in general. The door ought to be equally open to all . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at
413 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) (“And if it
be a just principle, that every government ought to possess the means of executing its own
provisions, by its own authority, it will follow, that in order to the inviolable maintenance of
that equality of privileges and immunities, to which the citizens of the union will be
entitled, the national judiciary ought to preside . . . .”); cf. The Federalist Papers, LIBR.
CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/federalist.html (last visited
Nov. 30, 2018) (“The Federalist Papers are considered one of the most important sources
for interpreting and understanding the original intent of the Constitution.”)
81

